Global Britain versus Little England? National Identity and the Future of the British Right

Aside from being an expression of the Conservative Party’s post-Brexit bravado, it is unclear what exactly ‘global Britain’ means. On different occasions, it has signified a continued commitment to liberal multilateralism, a ‘Singapore-on-Thames’, ‘global trading nation’ or an ‘empire 2.0’ based on new agreements with the anglosphere.

To establish what global Britain means and what purpose it serves within the politics of the British righr, use is made of two ideas about the role of concepts in political communication. First, the meaning of political concepts is often shaped by an implied relationship to an opposing concept. The term ‘global Britain’ implies an ideological counterpoint to little England. Second is the idea that political concepts often serve as ‘coalition magnets’, binding together attitudes that otherwise may be in tension. Simultaneously sounding both cosmopolitan and patriotic is key to the appeal of ‘global Britain’.

From Cameron-style ‘detoxifying’ to national conservatism

David Cameron committed to the goal of 0.7 per cent GDP for international aid spending, even whilst enacting a stringent programme of fiscal austerity at home. He also clearly differentiated himself from the anti-immigration rhetoric of the more populist right, famously describing the UKIP as full of ‘loonies, fruitcakes and closet racists’. Such liberal positioning was echoed by Theresa May and Boris Johnson and delivered a Conservative majority in the 2015 election.

The Brexit referendum result struck like a lightening bolt. Many then argued that voters craved a nationally orientated political culture rooted in community, place and traditional British identity. Despite their prior commitment to Cameron-style ‘detoxifying’, both May and Johnson made moves towards such a realignment. May declared that a ‘citizen of the world is a citizen of nowhere’. In 2019 came the Conservative’s ‘red wall’ victories.

The chaotic period since 2019 has further contributed to the transformation of Conservative politics and a splintering of the Brexit coalition. A new generation of politicians such as Suella Braverman and Kemi Badenoch were forged less by the need to detoxify the brand than by the threat on the party's right from populist rivals such as UKIP, the Brexit Party and—most recently—Reform UK. They have also had an example in Donald Trump of how politically lucrative it can be to fight culture wars with the progressive left.

From Braverman's claim that multiculturalism has ‘failed’, to Badenoch's insistence she ‘does not care about colonialism’, a more avowedly nationalistic and populist conservatism—of the kind familiar in many European countries—may be poised to become an active force, centralising a potential struggle between Cameron-style liberal conservatism and more populist national conservatism.

Global Britain or little England? Two visions of British national conservatism

One viewpoint, advocated explicitly by the academic Eric Kaufmann, is that the right should embrace a kind of twenty-first century ‘little Englandism’. Central to nineteenth and early twentieth century Little Englander beliefs was a view of imperialism as an elite project, not beneficial to ordinary Britons. A modern little Englandism would involve the rejection of global entanglements and efforts to preserve the particularities of British society such as ‘history, landscape, cuisine, sport and ethnoreligious composition’.8The lack of nostalgia for the British empire inherent in this little Englandism—in contrast to the imperial apologism found elsewhere on the right—is a noteworthy and perhaps surprising point of commonality with liberal and progressive views.

This tension between a little Englandism and a global Britain orientation, celebratory of the imperial legacy and more inclined to uphold cultural links with the Commonwealth, has deep roots in the postwar history of British conservatism.

It was noteworthy that Suella Braverman's keynote speech at the 2023 conference placed great emphasis on the connection that her immigrant parents—as Commonwealth subjects—had felt towards the UK. The long-running tension between viewing Britishness as more narrowly linked to white British culture and viewing it as more expansively connected to a global, multiethnic anglosphere is still visible within UK conservatism today.

Another important story of recent electoral history has been the improved performance of Conservatives with some minority ethnic groups. Yet, a little England nationalism may be less appealing to them than a global Britain ideology.

The discursive uses of global Britain

It appears that global Britain is already being invoked in internal struggles to define British conservatism on issues of identity and immigration. The question is what consequences it might have as a wider foreign policy concept. A nationalism of the postimperialist variety—committed to Commonwealth links and to Britain's role in the world—is substantially more compatible with these internationalist commitments than a little Englandism advocating protectionism, global retrenchment and harsh immigration restrictions. To preserve their influence, therefore, the most natural strategy for liberal conservatives may be to align their rhetoric with these postimperial conservatives.

Global Britain is a classic example of a coalition magnet, as it can be interpreted in both a liberal and cosmopolitan fashion, as well as more nationalistically.

When introduced by the Theresa May government as policy, ‘global Britain’ was often invoked to suggest a continued commitment to liberal multilateralism. It was principally connected with striking commercial agreements with foreign countries, not limited to the Commonwealth. It was only lightly suggestive of a more muscular nationalism and appears principally as a kind of patriotic packaging for conventional liberal multilateralist policies.

In contrast, Boris Johnson—a figure more implicated with national-populist politics—employed the term in a way that traded more in postimperial nationalism.13 Johnson revelled in a sense of British exceptionalism and greatness, replete with allusions to British imperial history and the intermingling of liberal cosmopolitanism with a kind of celebratory cultural nationalism.

Conclusion

The 2024 election can in large part be interpreted as a fracturing of the right, with Reform UK rallying a substantial voter base behind an assertively little Englander conservatism. Many in the Conservative Party are tempted to follow in this direction. Yet, doing so risks further damaging the Conservative brand with an increasingly diverse electorate. It is likely that ideological conflict between little England and global Britain views of national identity will be an important feature of the British right into the future.

There is much to attack in the concept of global Britain. Nonetheless, it arguably represents the best prospect for staving off a more forceful nationalism on the right. Should it fade from the scene, it is possible that one day internationalists will lament the disappearance of global Britain.