Theme: Parties & Elections | Content Type: Digested Read

The Voters We Couldn't See

Gulay Icoz

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| 7 mins read

SUMMARY

  • A first-hand account of the 2026 Tower Hamlets elections reveals why traditional campaigning can no longer detect the voters who decide the outcome.
  • It was a striking result: the Aspire party secured thirty-three of forty-five council seats, the Labour Party was reduced to five and the Green Party emerged as an equal opposition force.
  • The election showed that traditional canvassing is insufficient because of the 'contactability gap' between door-to-door canvassers and voters who form their political views on group chats and social media.
  • This gap is a structural problem that demands a structural response; new ways of finding and listening to voters.

From early evening on 7 May, polling stations across Tower Hamlets saw something odd. Voters arrived in visible numbers — often in groups, predominantly white British and white European, younger and middle-aged — who had been almost entirely absent from three years of doorstep canvassing. I had walked those streets, knocked on hundreds of doors, spoken to residents across every part of Bethnal Green West as the Labour candidate. These voters were not among them. The realisation, watching them queue at the polling station, was visceral: had the whole campaign been conducted in a parallel universe, reaching everyone except the people who would decide the result?

The 2026 local elections produced one of the more striking results of the cycle: Aspire, the party of returning mayor Lutfur Rahman, took 33 of Tower Hamlets’ 45 council seats. Labour, which had held 16, was reduced to five — its lowest number ever. The Green Party, which had held one seat, took five, matching Labour exactly. None of this happened by accident, and none of it is adequately explained by simply saying: ‘Labour had a bad night’.

A borough with its own political history

Tower Hamlets is not a typical case of council underperformance being punished, or forgiven, at the ballot box. Rahman’s political career has been genuinely unusual: deselected by Labour in 2010 over unproven allegations, elected as an independent, re-elected in 2014 under his own party banner, then removed from office in 2015 after an Election Court found him personally guilty of corrupt and illegal practices, including vote-rigging and religious intimidation. Barred from office for five years, he returned in 2022 and won again. In 2026 he won a fourth time, despite the council remaining under central government oversight for ongoing governance failures identified in a 2024 inspection.

That inspection makes an interesting footnote in itself: it was ordered by the outgoing Conservative government in February 2024, but the resulting intervention was announced and implemented by the incoming Labour government later that year — a rare moment of continuity across the political divide on the seriousness of what was going wrong in the borough.

What makes Tower Hamlets distinctive is not simply that its council has struggled — plenty of English councils are under some form of central oversight. It is that a leader with this specific history, and this specific relationship with central government intervention, keeps winning comfortably. Part of the explanation lies in how Aspire has successfully reframed the intervention itself: not as a legitimate response to governance failure, but as an attack on the borough’s right to govern itself. That framing has proven more durable, electorally, than the intervention itself.

The gap traditional campaigning can't see

But the more uncomfortable finding, for me personally, concerns Labour’s own campaign — because by every conventional measure, it was a good one. Contact rates were high. Canvassing happened almost daily in the run-up to the election. The manifesto was carefully built and written. And it made almost no difference, because a growing part of the electorate was never within reach of it in the first place.

Call it the contactability gap: the widening distance between the voters a door-to-door campaign can find, and the voters who now form and hold their political views somewhere else entirely — group chats, social media, algorithmic feeds — and who show up only on election day. This isn’t a wholly new problem; students and shift workers have always been hard to canvass. What has changed is the scale of it, and the consequence: in a fragmented, multi-party contest, a blind spot that was once background noise can now decide who wins.

The clearest evidence of this was the Green Party’s result. Green candidates in Bethnal Green West did almost no visible campaigning, yet outpolled Labour candidates. Voters who had spoken warmly to me on the doorstep quietly voted Green instead — not because they preferred Aspire to win, but because voting Green was, for them, an expression of identity that had nothing to do with tactical calculation. Political scientists call this expressive voting, and it is well documented. What is less well documented is how completely invisible it can be to a campaign that only ever measures itself against the people who answer their door.

What this means beyond Tower Hamlets

None of this is really about Tower Hamlets alone. The same Green surge that helped produce this result also delivered outright Green control of Hackney and made the Greens the largest opposition group in Islington. Inner London’s progressive vote is fragmenting between two parties whose combined support, under first-past-the-post, keeps producing outcomes that neither would have chosen. Layered on top, in Tower Hamlets specifically, was a national backdrop of Labour’s declining standing among Muslim voters since 2024, and a very personal, very local frustration with the Prime Minister that came up on the doorstep again: if you get rid of him, I would vote for you.

None of these forces are things a campaign can fix simply by knocking on more doors. The contactability gap is a structural feature of how a growing share of the electorate now engages with politics, and it demands a structural response — new ways of finding and listening to voters, not just working harder at old ones.

Tower Hamlets is a distinctive case, shaped by a specific political history I know better than most. But the puzzle it poses — how do you represent, and be held accountable by, an electorate you can no longer see coming — is one every party in urban Britain will have to solve.

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    Gulay Icoz

    Gulay Icoz is Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Business and Law at Middlesex University London.

    Articles by Gulay Icoz