Mayoral Strategic Authorities: Why Labour’s Devolution Plans Risk Entrenching Inequality

SUMMARY

• Labour’s English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill establishes Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs) with a standardised set of responsibilities.
• This model of devolution-through-standardisation risks entrenching rather than reducing England’s spatial inequalities.
• The policy may not work for areas with weaker institutions, thinner collaborative histories and fragile democratic engagement.
• Recognising difference — rather than legislating it away — is essential if devolution is to improve outcomes.

The Labour government’s English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (EDaCEB) represents its most ambitious attempt yet to “complete the map” of devolution by creating a common strategic tier of governance across England. Presented as a move to empower communities and rebalance regional inequalities, the Bill establishes Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs) with a minimum, standardised set of responsibilities.

The intuitive case for reform is strong: England is one of the most centralised and spatially unequal OECD countries, and many argue that decisions are made too far from local realities. Yet the presumption that every area can absorb and benefit from identical devolved powers overlooks deep institutional differences — and, as international evidence on decentralisation shows, outcomes vary sharply depending on local capacity and political context.

This article argues that the EDaCEB’s model of devolution-through-standardisation risks entrenching rather than reducing England’s spatial inequalities. By extending uniform responsibilities into areas with weaker institutions, thinner collaborative histories and fragile democratic engagement, the Bill may create mayoral standardised authorities rather than genuinely strategic ones. Three mechanisms are particularly important: uneven institutional capacity; the scale at which devolution is being standardised; and the centralising means through which the reforms will be implemented.

Why devolution is not one-size-fits-all

Standardising responsibilities presumes that places can incorporate similar governance changes. But institutional capacity varies widely, shaping how implementation unfolds across England. Greater Manchester Combined Authority, for example, has spent decades accumulating staff, expertise and organisational routines, employing around 3,500 people — roughly 1.22 staff per 1,000 residents. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority, by contrast, employs just 139 people, or 0.20 per 1,000 residents, reflecting a much thinner institutional base.

Austerity has compounded these differences: the most deprived councils saw funding cut by 31% per person, compared with 16% in the least deprived. The areas most in need of strong institutions are therefore the least equipped to absorb standardised responsibilities — a governance ‘catch-22’ — that implies the same devolved powers will be implemented very differently across the country, with consequences for widening inequalities.

Scale: Standard or Strategy?

The Bill’s vision of devolution rests on up-sizing — aggregating local authorities into larger strategic units. Yet evidence that bigger is better is thin. Research on merged planning authorities in England shows that consolidation often produces no improvements in cost or quality, while eroding tacit knowledge and slowing responsiveness.

The EDaCEB extends this logic in two ways: by concentrating responsibilities at a regional scale and by requiring two-tier areas to reorganise into unitaries before forming an MSA. Stronger, more coherent areas can manage this transition; weaker areas face major administrative disruption before any benefits materialise. Neighbourhood Area Committees offer only a limited counterargument to up-scaling: their mandated community-asset rights, fixed at ward level and operating amid highly uneven participation, risk creating the appearance of empowerment while further entrenching spatial inequalities.

The Challenges of Devolution and Place Identity

A further shift lies in how devolution will be delivered. Earlier devolution deals — though often criticised as opaque — allowed room for negotiation. Under the CLGDA, for example, North Somerset could opt out of the West of England Combined Authority, and the deal proceeded with the remaining councils. Under the EDaCEB, these powers disappear.

This raises an important question: if only six of the thirty-four initial applications for Mayoral Combined Authorities were approved under earlier legislation, is it realistic to assume that all areas are now equally ready for strategic devolution? Standardisation risks treating devolution as an end in itself — a map to be “completed” — rather than a process that must reflect institutional realities, local preferences and political histories.

The Bill also prohibits local-authority mayors in devolved areas, reducing scope for institutional experimentation. In urban regions with strong civic identities — such as Greater Manchester, where a shared industrial heritage, symbolised through the industrial bee, underpins collective governance — the strategic scale can make sense. But lessons from French decentralisation demonstrate that in more polycentric or rural areas, identities may not map neatly onto administrative boundaries, meaning that imposed strategic tiers may lack legitimacy or coherence. In places such as Norfolk and Suffolk, where historic identities, economic patterns and civic allegiances are far less unified, it is not obvious that a single strategic authority would command the requisite buy-in.

Governance, Accountability and Engagement

Furthermore, standardising responsibilities raises significant questions about how success is to be defined and measured. Combined authorities already blend characteristics of two governance types: broad, general-purpose authorities (Type I) and overlapping, task-specific jurisdictions (Type II). Creating MSAs further blurs these distinctions, eliding the substantial institutional differences between Greater London, established MCAs, shire counties and unitary districts. Stronger authorities can interpret and operationalise these strategic mandates; weaker ones face unclear expectations and greater risks of failure.

Democratic engagement presents a further challenge. Turnout in mayoral and local elections generally sits between 25% and 35%. While it is often assumed that more powers will boost democratic participation, recent research on newly devolved authorities finds no consistent turnout increase after powers are transferred. Adding new layers of governance also risks deepening political confusion. Surveys show that in several city-regions, residents are more likely to name the wrong mayor than the correct one. In contexts of low political literacy and weak civic engagement, scandals — such as the ongoing case involving the former Mayor of Liverpool — can reinforce distrust and damage the legitimacy of devolved institutions, even when unrelated to current leadership.

Moving Forwards

Two principles follow. First, good things take time. Effective devolution depends on earned autonomy, incremental institution-building and demonstrated capacity — as Greater Manchester’s decades-long evolution shows. Rapid uniform rollout risks overwhelming weaker areas and producing shallow, ineffective governance. Second, the best are not just legislated for. Places most in need of intervention are often the least prepared to absorb new powers. Without sustained investment and capacity-building, devolution risks amplifying rather than ameliorating inequalities.

The EDaCEB aims to empower communities, but by prioritising standardisation over local variation, it risks creating mayoral standardised authorities, not genuinely strategic ones. Recognising difference — rather than legislating it away — is essential if devolution is to improve outcomes rather than deepen England’s spatial divides.