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"We looked out from the entrance of Lime Street Station and saw a city which seemed to be slowly dying, unloved and unsung, in the Depression of the nineteen-twenties." Thus Helen Forrester in her harrowing memories, Twopence to Cross the Mersey. Liverpool has been much sung since then, even if not more loved, but songs are not enough. Mrs. Forrester's bankrupt father came to Liverpool to seek work because " having lived for years in prosperous, southern market-towns, he could not visualise what the Depression was doing to the north of England ". What is happening in Liverpool now has not been grasped by our masters in the South either. Knowing the facts, of course, is not enough. The politicians and civil servants who come up for the day to attend meetings or even to "meet the people" return without any real understanding of life by the Mersey. For that one has to live here. It is one of the worst faults of our system of government that decision-makers inhabit Westminster and Whitehall. The Celtic fringe probably suffers less from the "internal colonialism" which some political scientists have recently discovered than does Merseyside.
"Liverpool is quite simply a disaster area for school-leavers", stated the Education Guardian recently. Liverpool is not just worse off than other cities in the current depression: it was worse off before and it will be worse off after. Some, indeed, say it is a dying city. One is not supposed to say that. The local authority has instructed its staff to present a cheerful face for fear of frightening off such investors as may still be around. Warts-and-all accounts on TV and in the Press arouse anger for the same reason. It is nonsense, however, to think that massive private investment will come our way through glossy public relations. Better face the truth. What that is, of course, cannot be predicted with certainty. Economists–the wisest fools in Christendom–are never reliable. Local interests, for their part, have perhaps cried wolf too often, but the wolf does seem to be blowing our house down. One Liverpool firm, in a recent Chamber of Commerce survey, wrote: "We have survived two world wars, the blitz and the depression of the 1930s; I wonder whether we will last out the next twelve months?" Liverpool's plight needs to be taken seriously, not noted as a matter of statistics but experienced. Not just for the sake of Merseysiders, youth above all, but because the whole country will have to pay the price of its long-term malaise otherwise.
Bermuda Triangle of British Capitalism
Should one start with statistics or impressions? Impressions are hard to convey unless one has the gifts of Mrs. Forrester. They may also be dismissed by the unsympathetic as unreliable. So let me start with figures about unemployment. Unemployment is rising so quickly now that such figures are bound to be well below the present rate, but that does not make them any less significant, because even dated figures show the special position of this area. In January 1980 the unemployment rate stood at 12-7 per cent–higher than in any of the other six major conurbations and well above the 7-6 per cent for the North West and the 5.9 per cent for the country as a whole. Liverpool has (1) a higher level of permanent unemployment than elsewhere even in good times; (2) a higher level of cyclical unemployment, depression hitting it worse than elsewhere; and (3) a deteriorating position compared to the country as a whole, a steady loss of jobs widening the gap ever further.
A recent study described Merseyside as the Bermuda triangle of British capitalism. While the massive rise in unemployment in the last year has been the result of a national crisis, the longer term causes lie in the structure of the local economy. Liverpool grew as a port, but there has been a continuous decline in port-related activities: the end of the slave trade started the rot, followed by the disappearance of the transatlantic passenger trade and the cotton trade. The town's manufacturing base has always been relatively small. This means there has also been little in the way of skilled work, engineering for example, and thus no pool of skilled labour to attract new employers. The area is also vulnerable because the manufacturing sector is dominated to a greater extent than most other regions by a small number of national or international firms. Closures have been announced almost every month for years now, not just because of the current "shake-out" of labour but the result of rationalisation policies decided in London or abroad by faceless directors who have no personal connection with Merseyside.
The image of Merseyside–workers militant or bloody-minded–is often used to explain why the blow falls here rather than somewhere else. Statistics do not support this view (Department of Employment figures show that Merseyside comes sixth in the inter-city strike league, and that only because nationally strike-prone industries are over-represented here) but businessmen are not always rational. A more rational explanation is that Liverpool is being bypassed in the restructuring of British industry because of its geographical position. The current policy is to encourage the growth of small, locally-based firms instead, though it is hard to see this happening on a sufficient scale. Liverpool is also badly placed when it comes to developing the white-collar sectors of employment. Regional offices, for example, tend to gravitate to Manchester which is only 30 miles away. What has grown in Liverpool has been the public sector of employment: some 30 per cent of those employed in the City work for central and local government, the health service and public enterprise–yet another factor making Liverpool particularly vulnerable in the present climate.
Workplaces are disappearing all the time and there seems little reason to expect market forces to halt the trend. It seems almost inevitable in an economy where decisions are made by directors pursuing (quite properly) the financial interests of their companies regardless of social consequences or, indeed, of the fact that their companies, too, ultimately pay the costs of depressed areas. PR by local government to attract new industries and central government measures to encourage them are marginal. It is hard to visualise a reversal of Liverpool's decline except in a planned economy. The unemployed could move elsewhere, of course–at least when the economy picks up again. But there has already been an outflow of young, able-bodied, skilled and semi-skilled workers and this simply exacerbates inner-city problems caused by an unbalanced population. And should young people, in any case, be encouraged to seek work elsewhere? Mrs. Thatcher recently said that people should not expect to find work where they happened to live. That not only shows her divorce from the realities of life (families that depend on more than one bread-winner cannot easily move); it shows her own lack of roots in conservatism: what of community links and family ties as the basis of a well-ordered society? Work will have to be brought to the workers despite fashionable economic arguments to the contrary.
Let me turn back to figures as a measure of the local disaster. A recent study by our Planning Office showed that the Department of Employment statistics seriously underestimate total unemployment in the region. They show the number of persons registered as unemployed as a percentage of insured employees (including those registered unemployed). The base figure of insured employees is drawn from a census several years old, however, and the steady decline in permanent workplaces since then is ignored; ignored also is the fact that many are seeking work without being registered (e.g. married women not eligible for unemployment benefits) and that a large number of young people on temporary government schemes are also seeking proper jobs. In mid-1980, when the official figure for the Liverpool Travel To Work Area was around 13 per cent, something like 22 per cent of those seeking work in Liverpool (not quite the same area) could not find a job. This was something like 17 per cent of the total population-and unemployment figures as a percentage of the total population may give a better picture of the social consequences. (These figures should- doubtless be reduced to take account of those engaged in the" grey economy"-but the opportunities for earning a living in this way in Liverpool are almost certainly less than in more prosperous parts of the country.)
The Planning Office also showed that the official statistics masked the dramatic incidence of unemployment for certain groups and localities. In one inner-city planning district unemployment ran at 37 per cent, in another at 31 per cent; on one very large housing estate it reached 40 per cent (and all this does not take account of unregistered job-seekers). Figures are no better in certain outer-city council estates. There employment often depends on a few large factories, and closures have an even more dramatic effect on the community. In Speke, for example, some 45 per cent of the adult population depend on the state in one way or another for their income. There are areas of Merseyside, in other words, where it is an understatement to speak of massive unemployment: unemployment has become as normal as work.
A further breakdown by duration adds to the picture. The official statistics, and especially national figures, include a large element of transients, voluntary and involuntary job-changers on the register for a relatively short time. In Liverpool, at the beginning of 1980, 40 per cent of those on the register had been unemployed for more than a year, compared to 26 per cent nationally. This clearly has important implications for the individual and the community. In the past, long-term unemployment in Liverpool may have been attributed to an unusually large hard core of unskilled workers, unadapted to work or workshy. While there is some evidence that a hard core exists, it can only account for a small fraction of the long-term unemployed. Liverpool nevertheless has a disproportionate number of unskilled workers. The fact that in mid-1980 the ratio of general labourers to vacancies on the register of local Employment Offices was 283: 1 compared to a national average of 33:1 gives some indication of the character of the labour force and local problems. But other categories also came off badly: a ratio of 10:1 for craft occupations (2:1 nationally) and a ratio of 12:1 for clerical occupations (6:1 nationally). If you want numbers rather than percentages, to see the size of the problem, in September 1980 the Employment Offices had some 48,000 clients looking for work and 1,000 vacancies to offer.
Bleak Times for Youth
The incidence of juvenile unemployment locally is masked in much the same way by national figures about unemployed youngsters. The level in Merseyside is again higher than elsewhere, the concentration greater and the prospects bleaker. As unemployment continues to rise, the figures I quote, necessarily dated, once more understate the problem–terrible though they arc. The Planning Office calculated Liverpool rates of 36 per cent for those under 18 and 32 per cent for the 18-19 age group a year ago. In certain districts the rates are much higher and it is here that the most serious special problems arise. I will return below to these.
Of the summer 1980 school-leavers in Merseyside as a whole something like a third went on to further education or found employment in a reasonable time, another third joined youth opportunity schemes, while the rest remained entirely unemployed. With thousands of youngsters chasing literally a handful of jobs then, and the economic situation worsening since, they have no chance. Actual numbers may give a more realistic picture. In September 1980 5,700 young people were registered with the Careers Offices in Liverpool as seek.mg work. The figure fluctuates, of course, peaking at the end of the school year, declining as summer-leavers find jobs or are absorbed by youth opportunity programmes. September 10 years earlier, however, the number was only 1,300–a measure of Liverpool's deteriorating economy (while the Careers Service may have been less well organised then to reach all school-leavers, the total population was larger). Among those unemployed in September 1980 were some 900 who had left school in summer 1979 and almost 3,000 of the 5,300 who left in summer 1980. These figures show the high proportion of young people who cannot move directly from school to work (i.e. experience rejection in the labour market) and the significant proportion who have been unemployed for more than a year. In addition to those on the books of the Careers Service, there were some 2,500 under the age of 19 registered with the Employment Offices. These figures hide the true scale of shortfall in job opportunities because there were also some 4,200 youngsters on youth programmes of one sort or another. The other side of the coin is even more dramatic: the number of vacancies notified to the Careers Service was 12 in July, when school-leavers hit the streets, and has fallen as low as four. Of course, many youngsters compete for vacancies with adults in the Jobcentres and many find work by approaching employers directly–but the message here is no different. Firms report hundreds of applications for a single position and youngsters report almost as many unsuccessful letters or visits. While lack of qualifications may sometimes be a factor (of which more below), one Merseyside factory had 1,500 suitably qualified applicants for 50 apprenticeships.
The problem, again, has structural causes. In addition to the general decline in workplaces noted earlier, there seems to be a decline in job opportunities for the young. Cost-conscious firms have been reducing the number of young people taken on as trainees (and the number of apprenticeships in Liverpool has always been very low compared to other parts of the country) because of pessimistic assumptions about the future. They have also cut the number of school-leavers taken on for unskilled work and for odd jobs around the factory or office. Cost-cutting apart, some of the jobs that were suitable for such youngsters are probably disappearing as the result of technological developments. In other sectors, unions seem to have forced juvenile wages relatively high compared to adults, so that it hardly pays an employer to take on a young person when he can employ an experienced worker for little more. Public sector cutbacks, on the other hand, have reduced the number of outlets for 0-level leavers.
Many of the unemployed youngsters live in inner-city districts with their accumulation of problems. It is often said that from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s the heart was torn out of Liverpool. People were moved out by the local authorities, often against their own desires, as /art of slum clearance policies. Many of the better paid (i.e. skilled or semi-skilled) workers also moved out with their families. One way or another, the inner-city population was halved, leaving behind those least able to cope and poor accommodation that was filled by the disadvantaged of one sort or another. These areas are generally depressing beyond belief. Housing standards arc bad and accommodanon is overcrowded; there are few amenities; the environment is inhospitable; 15 per cent of the land is actually vacant or derelict; apartment blocks (never designed for living, it is true) have been vandalised beyond repair, boarded up or torn down–all adding to the atmosphere of decay. Other indicators of malaise are just as bad: poor health, low educational achievement, low incomes, high crime rates, many problem families and, of course, massive unemployment. Inner-city disasters are matched, however, in some of the newer outer-city estates. In Kirkby there are streets in which the shop-fronts are permanently boarded up, even in daytime, and where one house in seven has been vandalised: the visiting Southerner might think he was in parts of New York rather than Britain. Youngsters from these areas obviously enter the labour market with many handicaps. Among these is the image potential employers have of the district and its residents. "Liverpool 8 need not apply", a phrase that made the rounds some years ago, sums it up.
Some figures again, this time on educational achievements. Half of those registered as unemployed with the Liverpool Careers Offices in October 1979 had no qualifications whatsoever and a further 20 per cent only had CSE at grades 4/5–thus 70 per cent did not reach the level required for craft apprenticeships. The picture is not much different for school-leavers as a whole in certain districts. Examination results are so far below the national averages that the gap is almost as wide as between Britain and some Third World states. One survey, a couple of years ago, found that only 3.5 per cent had five or more 0-levels compared to 22 per cent in the North-West as a whole (a comparison which again shows how the regional tables that are usually published disguise the Liverpool reality from readers elsewhere). The great majority of children leave school at the earliest possible moment. Basic skills (the three Rs) are poor in many areas and there are areas which produce not a single school-leaver able to win a grant for higher education.
To some extent, their poor educational record makes such young people particularly vulnerable to unemployment As we have seen, there is already a large pool of unskilled labour seeking work while, on the whole, such workplaces seem to be on the decline–yet it is to such work that low achievers arc generally restricted. A survey of the Vauxhall area of Liverpool was undertaken some years ago. This is an area of multiple deprivation. A high proportion of the residents are unskilled or semi-skilled workers, incomes are low, unemployment high, and the environment as described earlier. School-leavers are set to follow their parents' footsteps: some 80 per cent of the group went into unskilled or semi-skilled work-two or three times the national average. While the absence of better work in the area was an important factor, their lack of qualifications would have barred them in any case.
Though the inner-city areas contain a disproportionate number of children born with handicaps of one sort or another, the effect of this is marginal in relation to the figures quoted above and their poor achievements cannot be ascribed to lower natural abilities (the cycle of deprivation theory). Nor, really, can they be explained entirely by poor educational facilities, poorer though these are than in middle-class areas despite LEA attempts to inject extra resources into priority areas. The negative attitude of children to school goes some way to explaining their record. Partly because their families live in overcrowded tenements without play space at home, children play in the streets from an early age and develop strong peer-group cultures hostile to school, reflected in high truancy rates or, at best, switched-off attendance. Unlike the children of the "established" working class, encouraged by their parents to see career prospects in education or at least taught to see school as an inescapable fact of life, the children here opt out wherever possible. Yet another study of a downtown area (disguised as Roundhouse) notes the way in which children of six and seven years arc already socialised into a subbculture which makes it psychologically difficult for them to take advantage of educational and other opportunities that occur thereafter.
One explanation of low achievement, therefore, is that school is marginal to the lives of such youngsters. Their attitude can be seen in another light, however. The Vauxhall survey suggested that they switched off from school because they quite realistically saw it as a waste of time. Their horizons were not necessarily as limited as their subsequent careers suggest. Many boys would have liked industrial apprenticeships and girls also mentioned jobs that actually required some qualifications. A more recent study in the Granby area showed that many hoped to find more rewarding jobs at a future stage in their lives and were not really aware of the trap in which they were caught. The absence of parental experience or local job opportunities, however, removes any practical reinforcement for such dreams.
It is wrong, nevertheless, to attach too much weight to the educational factor in explaining the high rate of juvenile unemployment. True, some young people appear almost unemployable to many employers, either because of their apparent illiteracy or because of their dress and manner. Much effort is currently put by the Manpower Services Commission and FE colleges into teaching them "life skills", meaning how to apply for a job, and there is some evidence that such instruction can be effective. Young people do get jobs as a result and, to their surprise, employers often find a heart of gold beneath the rough exterior : workers as useful as those of more orthodox appearance, even as pleasant. They also find that some of the jobs for which they usually demand school qualifications can be done quite as well without (O-level requirements are too often just a way of shortening the queue of applicants). But none of this makes more jobs available. There is no evidence that employers take on more young people because applicants are better prepared. To that extent, the whole campaign to make young people more "employable" is irrelevant to the underlying, structural causes of juvenile unemployment and runs the risk of misleading those concerned with youth programmes.
Having made this point, let me immediately stress that the teaching of life skills is not irrelevant as far as individual youngsters are concerned. Juvenile unemployment rates, high though they are, mask even more serious problems for particular groups: those who because of poor school records, personal characteristics or even the wrong address, find it hardest to impress employers. The longer they are unemployed, the harder they find it. Employers often prefer the recent school-leaver to youngsters who have been without work for any length of time, suspecting that the latter are unemployable. There may even be some truth in this as youngsters develop "undesirable" attitudes or their spirit is simply undermined. While courses do not increase the number of vacancies, they may give those at the bottom of the pile a better chance of getting one of the available jobs, distributing employment and unemployment more evenly among the age group and thus breaking the vicious circle which leads to a hard core of permanently unemployed.
Time Bomb of Unemployment?
A few years ago, in the early days of the Job Creation Programme, a dinner was held in Liverpool for the chairmen of area boards from throughout the country and as the local chairman I was called on for some after-dinner words. I warned of the effects of unemployment on the young, particularly of the social and political consequences of disaffection. "Ridley's rivers of blood speech", as it came to be known, apparently caused much offence among the more conservative participants. Shortly after, however, in 1978, my fears became respectable. Peter Walker said in a Commons debate that we were entering a phase in which a whole crowd of young people were becoming hostile to society.
He saw two consequences of extensive and extended juvenile unemployment. The first was that while young people were not yet organised by the criminal network, they would be if the current situation continued. The crime wave is already with us, even if not organised. Crime is the only booming industry in Merseyside. I have referred to vandalism. This is not just a matter of smashed lamp-posts and graffiti but of the systematic destruction of housing and other social facilities by young people. Not that they see this as a crime, and indeed there is no profit in it for them: it is simply a way of passing the time. Juvenile crime figures are alarming for all that. Something like a quarter of all prosecutions by the Merseyside police involve children under 16 and another quarter of young people between 16 and 21. Though prosecutions run high, moreover, they are only the tip of the iceberg as only a small proportion of offenders are ever caught.
Crime cannot be directly attributed to unemployment. The crime rate, though gradually increasing., was high before the present crisis and many of the offenders are still of school age in any case (around 40 per cent of those caught stealing, because one must add in the juveniles cautioned by the police on their first offence and not prosecuted). But under-16 crime is particularly high in those districts where unemployment is also high and the latter is inseparable from the environment of social malaise in which crime becomes part of the normal way of life. The great majority of juveniles of working age that appear in the courts, moreover, and the majority of adults, appear to be unemployed. In the words of one 19-year-old: "people can't get jobs and the dole money is useless and so people take to robbing; it's as simple as that". It isn't as simple, of course, but enforced idleness is doubtless a factor, as is the feeling of exclusion from work. A recent report of the Merseyside Probation Service showed that 80 per cent of its clientele had no jobs. It noted that the boredom and frustration of unemployment could lead to anti-social behaviour and, more serious, that anti-social attitudes could harden as unemployable ex-offenders came to feel unwanted and outside the mainstream of society.
Peter Walker's second point was that political forces, including the National Front and extreme left-wing revolutionary organisations, were taking full advantage of unemployment. Whether exclu-sion from work and rejection by organised society, for that is how it is often seen, will also lead to serious political alienation is another matter. Some would argue that there is already considerable alienation among inner-city populations and that unemployment is only one of the many factors involved. Positive attachment to our institutions is probably not as high as our politicians like to think anywhere in Britain, but cynicism about the system and those that operate it may be "especially high in Liverpool. The structure of local party politics may have as much to do with this as social malaise (hence the astonishing success of Liberals in mobilising an anti-establishment vote at local elections). More to the point, however, is that a recent survey of young people in Liverpool 8 found that 85 per cent of those interviewed had no political convictions at all; many were vehement in their indifference to politics. Half the group were even unwilling to define themselves as members of the working (or any other) class-hardly fertile soil for extremist movements of the Left.
What we may have among the disadvantaged inner-city young, in other words, is passive alienation. They have opted out of the polity if, indeed, they were ever socialised into it in the first place. There is no sign yet of significant political activity among the young directed against the existing order. Opinions differ about the extent to which alienated youngsters form a pool that could be mobilised by political activists. Conservatives and social democrats may fear it, the far Left may hope for it, but I have my doubts. The intellectual demands revolutionary movements make on their members (reading news-sheets, etc.) and the commitments of time they demand (selling news-sheets, etc.) are probably too high. The National Front is another matter, because it offers a rather different outlet for frustrated energies. Street fights are more likely to strike a chord than organised political action. But it is well to remember that riots can be triggered off by all sorts of organisations or, indeed, by no organisations at all. There, perhaps, lies the real danger. A generation idle and frustrated because unemployed; rejected by employers, thus alienated; concentrated in certain districts where the environment itself is grim-not revolution, but simple undirected violence and pointless destruction.
As Harold Macmillan pointed out in his recent TV interview, the costs of unemployment outweigh whatever eventual benefits the present Government may see, either in the gradual dampening of inflation or in the gradual restructuring of British industry. The loss of production nationally cannot be offset in a few years: by then we will have further weakened our competitive position in world trade and thus marched further along the road of deindustrialisation. Even if the economy did revive, the wasted years could never be offset for the individual by subsequent employment. This is particularly true of the school-leaver. Some will never fulfil their work potential because of the absence of opportunities to develop skills in their formative years. Some will be psychologically affected by their apparent rejection by society: though the adult unemployed may experience greater financial hardship, it is for the juvenile that the experience is likely to be most traumatic, because he is at the most vulnerable age emotionally. Many will doubtless settle later into normal patterns of work and life, but some will remain permanently scarred. If that is not a time-bomb already set, it is a bomb whose fuse may be lit in some future crisis.
Meanwhile, we all have to pay the costs of unemployment, direct and indirect. Enlightened self-interest, if nothing else, should convince us that juvenile unemployment costs us more than we can ever hope to recoup if and when Thatcherite policies succeed. A permanently depressed Merseyside will also remain a financial charge on a revived economy. The unconservative disciples of laissez-faire who have taken over the Conservative Party may dismiss humanitarian policies as a form of "do-goodism" that only harm the economy–but they are bad book-keepers. They may dismiss economic planning as distortion of the economy–but that, too, is bad book-keeping.
When I was a student of political science, and Sir Ivor Jennings was the textbook we read, the case made for stable one-party government with strong leadership was that it enabled a government to implement its policies. We could then judge its success or failure. The phrase, I remember, was that a government should be given a rope long enough to hang itself. Unlike Mrs. Thatcher, I am against capital punishment. But I am coming round to it.
This article was originally published in the Political Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 1, Jan 1981, under the title 'View from a Disaster Area: Unemployed Youth in Merseyside'.
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