From Our Archive: 'It Wasn't Us and We Didn't Benefit'. The Discourse of Opposition to an Apology by Britain for Its Role in the Slave Trade

The last decade has witnessed a marked increase in cases of what might be termed the 'politics of apology' in which various groups have sought apologies for historical injustices from organisations, communities or governments. The reasons for this increase are not entirely clear; however, it may be linked to the increased significance of 'identity' politics in the public sphere and to the advent of a more self-reflexive style of politics found, for example, in the administrations of Blair, Clinton and Schroeder.I Relatedly, many countries have witnessed a 'back-lash' or critique of these claims, believing them to be unjustified and often informed by 'special pleading' or involving an unwarranted attack on the nation's past. It is within this context that a debate took place about the validity of an apology by Britain for its role in the slave trade. The year 2007 marked the bicentenary of the passage of legislation that banned the trading of slaves in British ships, although in recent discussion the legislation was often presented as that which abolished slavery. Claims for an apology for the slave trade had been articulated before; however, the bicentennial year and the year preceding it were marked by press coverage of various pressure groups and religious organisations arguing that the British government should apologise for the practice. The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wrote an article in November 2006 in the New Nation, a newspaper of the Black British community, in which he stated:

Significantly, Blair did not apologise for the slave trade. It appears that this was from a mixture of motives. The Observer reported that Whitehall advisers thought an apology would lead to reparation claims from descendants of slaves, and the historian Tristram Hunt in the same edition claimed an apology might goad 'middle England' and implied that Blair thought that an apology was not logical as the current administration could not be held responsible for the actions of previous ones.

The principal objective of this article is to examine the grounds on which the claim for an apology for slavery was opposed. Therefore, the arguments for an apology will not be considered in detail; however, some brief observations will be made for the sake of contextualisation.

Why an apology?

The claims for an apology have different aspects and particular groups emphasise different ones. The following aspects are not comprehensive, but give a flavour of the case for apology. For some campaigners, an apology is justified because contemporary (white) British society benefits from the legacy of economic development based, at least in part, on slavery. In addition, some claim that the present unequal economic relationship between the 'first' and 'third' worlds is connected directly to former colonial structures and practices underpinned by racism, which itself justified the practice of slavery. The main point to note here is that the con-temporary condition of peoples within Britain and outside cannot (and should not) be disconnected or separated from the historical fact of slavery.

Relatedly, the debate is closely connected to both different interpretations of history and to how history relates to the present. Campaigners see the lack of apology as a refusal to acknowledge or recognise the history of the death and enslavement of millions of Africans; not in the sense of denying it happened, but failing to recognise its enormity and accord it sufficient attention in discussions or representations of British history, at either a popular or academic level. However, this is not just about historical interpretation or the representation of history. This history cannot be divorced from contemporary experience in the sense that the failure to accord this his-tory and the events involved proper significance reflects, and reinforces, the persistence of contemporary racist attitudes. Therefore the past and present are necessarily connected.

If one were to accept the analysis above, would this underpin convincingly the claim for an apology? I have else-where argued that the claim for an apology, in what may be termed the 'public sphere', is justified if certain criteria are satisfied. These criteria include that an injustice must have been committed, responsibility must be demonstrated (one can be sorry about or regret, but not apologise for, things for which was one was not responsible) and there need to be identifiable victims of the injustice. These criteria should be borne in mind when considering the objections outlined below.

Given that no significant political or moral tradition is prepared to defend slavery today and that, arguably, an apology could improve inter-communal or inter-state relations, there might appear to be a pragmatic prima facie case for an apology. However, although it is hard to quantify with certainty, the balance of popular opinion in Britain appears to be against an apology being given. In the section that follows, a typology of seven arguments against the apology is outlined and a commentary offered on the status of their objections and the assumptions contained therein.

Opposition to an apology

'It wasn't us: we weren't even born': The question of responsibility

A common strand in the discourse of opposition to an apology is that the people responsible for the trade are dead and people alive today are not responsible and, therefore, cannot apologise. This is because, as indicated above, one cannot apologise for things for which one is not responsible. The following quotations will provide a flavour of this position. Although sympathetic to 'practical' policies like debt relief for African countries, former Labour MP Tony Benn said Bristol did not need to apologise for its role in the slave trade: 'My own feeling is from a practical point ... no one living alive [sic] in Bristol today is in any way responsible.'II In an exchange in the Times with academic Norman Geras, Ben Macintyre argued that, in contrast to cases where those responsible for actions are apologising, 'an apology without some sense of responsibility, for events that occurred far beyond living memory, is purely symbolic, an empty gesture'. In a similar vein, a letter to the Daily Telegraph claimed that: 'Apologies by people alive today for something their ancient fore-bears may have done is pointless and costs nothing.' The Conservative leader David Cameron was quoted as saying: 'I don't actually think that one generation can meaningfully apologise for something that a previous generation did.'

The lack of responsibility is a common theme in the discourse, yet the claim is not wholly persuasive. As I have outlined elsewhere, a case can be made that it is meaningful for a government to apologise for the actions of a previous administration owing to the historical continuity of institutions. For example, Blair, as a representative of the British government, could meaningfully apologise for slavery endorsed by previous British governments. The fact that he was not alive at the time does not render the apology meaningless. A similar point is made by Norman Geras in the exchange noted above. He states:

For some commentators the responsibility across generations is not restricted to states or governments, but is extended to peoples or communities. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre and others argue that communal continuity means that the cur-rent members of a society or community inherit obligations, debts and so on from former members and cannot claim that 'it has nothing to do with them' on the grounds that the event in question pre-dated their birth.

'We didn't benefit; neither did our ancestors'

A second basis of opposition to an apology is one that challenges the idea that Britons in general benefited from the slave trade. To paraphrase, if one, or one's ancestors, are or were not rich, why should one feel responsible for, or guilty about, the trade? Four examples of this objection are detailed below.

A letter to The Guardian welcomed the apology, but continued: 'I am perplexed as to who should be doing the apologising and to whom. My ancestors had no part in the slave trade and were, in fact, treated little better than slaves.' The letter

then outlines the working and living conditions of the British working class at this time. A similar but more intemperate example in the Wolverhampton local paper stated, in response to demands for an apology and compensation for descendants of slaves: 'Dream on. Most Britons' ancestors were penniless toilers in mines, factories or on the land. They were little better off than plantation slaves and probably endured worse health.' With heavy irony, a letter to the Daily Telegraph stated: 'I have traced ancestors back to the early I9th century who, aged eight and I0, worked in a cotton mill in Derbyshire. I know they would want me to apologise for the profit they made from the slave trade and their responsibility for the Irish potato famine.' Another Guardian letter in late 2006 argued that apology and compensation should come from the descendants of beneficiaries and not from the government as 'the majority of British people did not condone or benefit from this trade, and should not fund any compensation'.

These objections raise two important points. First, there is an implicit criticism of the idea outlined above of collective, transgenerational responsibility. On the basis that only the rich or ruling class benefited from slavery, it is claimed that it is unreasonable for the British community as a whole to either apologise or fund compensation or reparation. Second, it is a critique, or rejection, of the argument of some pro-apology groups that the relative affluence of British society as a whole (as opposed to the ruling class or certain commercial interests) is a result of slavery. The extent to which the past or current affluence of British society is a result of the slave trade is, in principle, amenable to empirical investigation, but the methodological issues involved are formidable and it is unlikely economic historians would reach a consensus on this issue.

'Apologise to whom?': The indeterminacy question

A third objection to the apology raises the problem of identifying or defining clearly the victims. One political or moral perspective may see slaves themselves as the only direct or 'real' victims, while another may include descendants of slaves or entire communities. However, even then it is not always clear who might constitute the community. This point is raised in a letter to the Financial Times that states:

An opponent of an apology claimed that its ludicrousness was illustrated by the fact that an apology to Africa for Britain's role also meant that descendants of slave-traders as well as slaves had been the recipient of the apology. For those who raise this objection, there are two strands to the problem of indeterminacy. First, to generalise, they are not convinced that contemporary Africans or Black Britons are victims in a demonstrable or meaningful way that slaves were. In that case, an apology is not owed because the apology should go to those directly wronged. Second, and per-haps relatedly, because wronged individuals cannot now easily be identified, any apology would be given to collectivities ('Africa' or 'Black Britons') rather than individuals. The issue here is that the liberal tradition of law tends to view the victims of the commission of wrong-doing or injustice as individuals (or groups of individuals) to whom reparation (in this example: the apology) should be made. The implication of this is that apologies to groups or collectives are philosophically and legally unsustainable or, at least, of dubious worth.

'It was all so long ago': The temporal factor

This objection overlaps to an extent with the first and third objections given above. At least two examined sources cite the Roman period as analogous to bolster the argument that as the events were so long ago, the apology is invalid. In an interview with members of the Bristol-based Society of Merchant Venturers, the Guardian cited the following:

A letter to the Daily Telegraph asked rhetorically: 'Should the Italians apologise to us for the Romans taking young British girls to sell via African slaving posts to the Far East? Of course not.' The question of the passage of time was raised by Conservative Party leader David Cameron. While he offered support for a national day of remembrance for slavery, he stated: 'But on the question of apology, I don't find very powerful or persuasive the idea of apologising for something that happened centuries ago. It's easy words.'

The problem of time lapsed can connect to the problem of responsibility or of identifying those considered to be victims, but is conceptually different. The difficulty with what one might call the 'statute of limitations' objection of itself is that it is unclear why time should be a crucial factor unless it is necessarily linked to these other factors. The problem seems to be one of indeterminacy: after how many years would it be absurd to apologise for past actions? In the span of human existence, 200 years is a very short time so time of itself is not a compelling reason to dismiss the possibility of an apology. (The passage of time may make it harder to identify victims, but this is conceptually a different problem.)

'Stop running down our country': The representation of history

The debate over the apology for slavery is also, I would argue, part of a wider argument about the representation of British history and, through this, Britain itself. Many opponents of apology, as did the British government, emphasised the role Britain played in the abolition of slavery and wanted to promote a positive view of British history. The implication is that those advocating the apology are either oversimplifying the complexities of history or are engaged in a conscious attempt to denigrate Britain. An example of this position is the right-wing columnist Melanie Phillips:

The Sun columnist 'Gaunty' provided another 'populist' example of this sentiment. He claimed: '[T]he fact that we led the world in abolishing this foul and inhumane trade doesn't seem to matter to the revisionists and apologists who constantly want to run down our history. . . it's just another example of New Labour's hatred of Britain and its history and I want no part of it.' An accentuation of the positive is also found in the interview with David Cameron cited above: '[W]e need to celebrate the fact that Britain led the way in the abolition movement. We can take pride in that.' Three points can be made here about this critique of apology. First, it is based in part on accusing the pro-apologists of 'bad' history, of making causal connection between events and developments, such as slavery and contemporary African poverty, which is not sustainable. However, the debate is clearly not 'simply' about the weighing of historical evidence and issues of methodology. The second point to note is that opponents of apology accuse those who favour it of a partial reading of history that is often politically motivated. This, of course, mirrors the critique made by the pro-apology lobby that argues that much 'conventional' history fails to recognise the enormity of the slave trade and its legacy and also focuses excessively on the role of white people in the abolition movement. The differences under the first point are, in principle, amenable to resolution by research and study; the differences under the second point are not. Third, such arguments over the interpretation of history and the 'politicisation' of history are a common con-temporary phenomenon and can be situated comparatively. In many countries, both popular and academic history are sites of contention often marked by the political 'right' objecting to any perceived degrading or 'running down' of a nation's or community's history.

'We weren't the only ones; others did it too'

As Tristram Hunt has noted, the role of others in the slave trade has been cited as a reason not to apologise: 'One of the most persistent objections to this sort of statement [the apology] rests on the pre-existence of slavery in African society. There was a strong culture of slave trading prior to the European arrival in Africa.' Three examples from letters to newspapers will suffice to give a flavour of this discourse.

[Another correspondent] asks why Britain has not apologised for its part in the slave trade. Perhaps it's waiting to follow the lead of the African and Muslim slavers it traded with and copied. Or maybe for the Italian apology; after all, what built and sustained the Roman empire?

The relative frequency of this form of objection suggests that there is a perception that Britain is being 'picked on' or singled out unfairly. However, this objection does not seem well-grounded in the sense that the validity (or otherwise) of the apology does not logically depend on the actions of others. In other words, if the injustice of slavery, in which Britain participated, merits an apology, then the fact that others may have participated and have not apologised does not negate the claim. If opposition to an apology is based, for example, on the responsibility issue discussed above, then the participation of others is irrelevant to the grounds on which the apology is opposed.

'It's not enough and there are more important issues'

The final objection is of a different order to those discussed above as it is principally informed by the belief that an apology, or an apology alone, is inadequate because it would be better to focus on practical policies to improve conditions in the contemporary world and is not based on philosophical objections or informed by the judgement that the apology is underpinned by 'bad history'. Examples of these practical policies include reparations to descendants of slaves, debt relief for African nations, supporting contemporary anti-slavery campaigns and the funding of university places for black students. This position is also influenced by the belief that an apology, or expression of regret, without such practical (and financial) commitments is insufficient. In the words of a Bristol-based activist: 'People are saying when you do apologise you have to say what you will do to make amends-reparations is what people are talking about.'

Although there is not a consensus among pressure groups and those sympathetic to the general project about what form reparations should take or who should be the recipients, there is often an emphasis on the need for practical measures that would both improve the condition of individuals or communities and demonstrate the sincerity of an apology. An example of this position was given by the Director of Anti-Slavery International, who claimed:

For an apology to have meaning, Anti-Slavery International's Fight for Freedom I807-2007 campaign is calling for measures to address the continuing legacies of the slave trade. These include racism and the long-term impact on the underdevelopment of countries in Africa and the Caribbean.

Conclusion

Opposition to the claim for an apology has been articulated on at least seven different grounds as outlined above. For analytic purposes, these can be divided into three broad groups. Within the first group are those people or organisations that do not seem to reject the validity of the apology in politics per se, but argue that the case of slavery does not satisfy the necessary criteria. Principal among these are those of responsibility and indeterminacy. In others words, because the perpetrators of the injustice (those responsible) are dead and the victims are also dead or cannot be identified the claim for an apology is not well-grounded.

Opposition within the second category is, I would argue, more political and politicised. Although it may share some of the concerns about, for instance, responsibility of those in group one, opposition tends to be more visceral and based on a perception that the demand for an apology constitutes either an illegitimate attack on British history and/or constitutes 'special pleading' by minority interest groups. Those adopting such a position are principally to be found on the political 'right'. In the final analysis, whether one finds this group's critique convincing or not is likely to be determined by one's general political inclination. The third category is different from the other two in that those within it are less likely to engage in either a critique based on categorical inadequacies (e.g., in respect of responsibility and indeterminacy) or on a more politicised opposition. Rather, individuals and organisations in this category, often from a liberal-left perspective, tend to consider the apology not as unsustainable or politically dubious, but less useful or relevant than more 'practical' ways with which to mark and remember slavery and its impact.

This article was originally published in The Political Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 2, April-June 2008.

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